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CHARLES KORNOFF et al., Respondents, v. KINGSBURG
COTTON OIL COMPANY
Corporation) Appellant.
[1] Trespass-Damages.-Where a trespass to land is of a permanent nature, all damages, past and prospective, are recoverable
in one action, but where the trespass is temporary in character,
only those damages may be recovered which have accrued up
to the time of commencement of the action, since it is not to
be presumed that the trespass will continue.
[2] Nuisances-Damages.-Under the rule that where injunctive
relief is not appropriate or where successive actions are undesirable either to plaintiff or defendant or both the nuisance
may be considered permanent, property owners suing for all
damages, past, present and future arising from quantities of
fumes, vapors, dust, etc., being emitted from a cotton gin
operated on adjacent property may recover such damages.
[3] Id.-Pleading.-Where plaintiffs' amended complaint against
the owner and operator of a cotton gin shows that the comfort
and enjoyment of the plaintiffs and their family have been
diminished to the extent that they have been unable to live
normally and peacefully and follow ordinary pursuits, that
the use of their shop has been seriously curtailed due to the
said dust and cotton lint particles and plaintiffs have been
deprived of the full value of same, and that they have
suffered severe nervous distress and mental anguish, such
pleading is sufficient to permit damages for discomfort and
anguish if such damages are otherwise proper.
[4] Id.-Damages.-Discomfort and annoyance suffered by plaintiffs from defendant's cotton gin operated on adjacent property
is an injury directly and proximately caused by defendant's
invasion of their property, and such damages would naturally
result from such an invasion.
[5] !d.-Damages: Trespass-Damages.-Once a cause of action
for trespass or nuisance is established, an occupant of land
may recover damages for annoyance and discomfort that
would naturally ensue therefrom.
[6) Id.-Da1nages.-Where plaintiffs' lawns, flowers, shrubs, window screens, hedges and furniture were covered with a thick

[1] See Cal.Jur., Trespass, § 35 et seq. Am.Jur .• Trespass, § 49
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trespass, § 28; (::!, 4, 6) Nuisances,
§62; [3] Nuisances, §50; [5] Nuisances, §62; Trespass, §26;
[7, 8] Nuisances, § 62; Trespass, § 28.
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coating of dust and lint and ginning waste from a cotton gin
owned and operated by defendant on adjacent property, the
annoyance and discomfort suffered by plaintiffs as a result of
such ·injury to their real property was a natural consequence
thereof.
[7] !d.-Damages: Trespass-Damages.-Where a person is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past
invasion and not amounting to a total destruction in value, the
damages include compensation for discomfort and annoyance
in an action brought by the occupant.
[8] !d.-Damages: Trespass-Damages.-Whether the case involves a nuisance or a trespass, an award of damages may be
allowed for discomfort and annoyance where the only injury
is to real property, since such an injury may cause discomfort
and annoyance without also causing an actual physical injury
to the person.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno
County. Philip Conley, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages resulting from operation of a cotton
gin on land adjacent to plaintiffs' property. Judgment for
plaintiffs affirmed.
David S. Davis and Charles Ray Barrett for Appellant.
James C. Janjigian, N. Lindsey South and L. Kenneth Say
for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Defendant Kingsburg Cotton Oil Company
appeals from an adverse judgment entered on a jury verdict
given after it had been granted a limited new trial on the
sole issue of damages. No appeal was taken from the order
granting the limited new trial.
Defendant owns and operates a cotton gin on land adjacent
to plaintiffs' property which is used for residential purposes
and the operation of a planing mill. The area in question
was zoned for business and commercial purposes. Defendant
is engaged in the business of ginning lint cotton and processing cottonseed, which lasts approximately six months of each
year. During the ginning season, plaintiffs alleged that large
quantities of fumes, vapors, dust, dirt, sediment, lint and
waste materials were emitted into the atmosphere and penetrated into the house and shop, covering them with an
offensive, injurious and adhesive coating of dust, lint and
ginning waste and causing injury to their house, furniture,
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and persons. At the first trial, the jury found plaintiffs
had suffered injury to their real property and assessed damages in the sum of $10,000; it was specifically found that
neither plaintiff had sufi'ored any dam::-,ge to his, or her, person.
A new trial was thereafter granted on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict as to the ''issue
of damages only." At the conclusion of the second trial,
the jury returned the following verdict: "We, the Jury in
the above entitled action, assess plaintiffs' damages in the
sum of $9541.00; and our verdict is for the plaintiffs, CHARLES
KoRNOFF and ELEANOR KoRNOFF, husband and wife, and
against the defendant, KINGSBURG CoTTON OIL CoMPANY, a
corporation, for said amount." A judgment was thereafter
entered and defendant appeals.
At the second trial on the sole issue of damages, the jury
was instructed as follows :
"If, under the Court's instructions, you should find that
plaintiffs are entitled to a verdict for a sum greater than
merely nominal damages, then you shall determine the items
of claimed detriment which I am now about to mention,
provided you find each of such items to have been suffered
by plaintiffs, and provided further that you find each of such
items to have been suffered by plaintiffs as the proximate
result of the act or acts of trespass complained of:
"1. Such sum as will reasonably compensate the said plaintiffs for the damage to their real property. That sum is equal
to the difference in the fair market value of the real property
immediately before and after the injury; provided, however,
that if the injury has b2en repaired, or be capable of repair,
so as to restore the fair market value of plaintiffs' real
property as it existed immediately before the injury, at an
expense less than such difference in value, then the measure
of damage is the expense of such repair, rather than such
difference in value.
'' 2. Such sum as will reasonably compensate plaintiffs as
the owner-occupants of the land, including members of their
household, for discomfort and annoyance to them, if any,
proximately caused by the act or acts of trespass complained
of. The amount of damages to be awarded for this element
of the injury, if any, is left to the sound judgment and
discretion of the jury based upon the evidence, and without the
necessity of any witness having given his opinion with respect
to the amount of such damar,rs, if any." (Emphasis added.)
The jury was instructed at defendant's request that plain-
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tiffs had suffered a trespassory invasion "(more or les."'
continuous in nature
the cotton ginning season)":
also at defendant's request, that the sum which would
reasonably compensate plaintiffs for the damage to their real
property was the ''sum
to the difference in the fair
market value of the real property immediately before and
after the
however, that if the injury ha.<~
been
or be capable of repair, so as to restore the
fair market value of plaintiffs' real property as it existed
immediately before the injury, at an expense less than such
difference in value, then the measure of damage is the expense
of such repair rather than such difference in value."
At the trial, plaintiffs' attorney argued that plaintiffs were
seeking past, present and future damages for the injury to
their real property. Defendant contends that where a continuing trespass is involved, as distinguished from a permanent trespass, future damages are not recoverable. While
no instruction was given the jury concerning the distinction
between permanent and continuing trespass, the following
statement was made by the court in the presence of the jury:
"Now, I'll repeat a question. Mr. Say, that I asked you
in the absence of the jury. Is it the contention of your
clients, Mr. and Mrs. Kornoff, that the alleged damage that
they complain of in this suit is permanent and that it will
continue in the future and that they are asking damages now
for all of the adverse effects which have happened in the
past and which may happen in the future from the operation
of this gin of the defendant's ~
"Mr. Say: Yes, your Honor, I think the word which I
may put into the record, that we are asking for damages for
past, future, present and prospective damages.
''The Court: Will you proceed with your case, Mr. Barrett.''
The record shows that the trespass occurs only during the
ginning season of each year-a period of approximately six
months; that the action was brought in 1953; that defendant's operations commenced in 1951. The parties apparently
treated the trespass as permanent because of its recurrent
character, rather than as a continuous trespass. The defendant's requested instructions, which were given, gave as the
measure of damages that for a permanent trespass, although
during the second trial, defendant's counsel argued that
future damages were not recoverable.
[1] The general rule appears to be that where a trespass
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a permanent nature, all
and prospective, are recoverable in one action, but where the trespass
is temporary in character, only those damages may be recovered which have accrued up to the time of the commencement
of the action, since it is not to be presumed that the trespass
will continue. (24 Cal.Jur., p. 69G; Carbine v.
126
Cal.App.2d 386 [272 P.2d 849].) In Slater v. Shell Oil Co.,
58 Cal.App.2d 864, 870 [137 P.2d 713]. an action for ejectment to enforce the removal of defendant's
line from
the property of plaintiff, and for damages for the use and
occupation of the land was involved. 'The court said:
''Though the right to sue for ejectment and damages may
be exercised in the same action by reason of section 427, subdivision 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, they are nevertheless independent and inconsistent causes of action based
upon the same invasion of the same right. \VhQre, therefore,
a party elects to sue for damages past and prospective he is
deemed to have waived the invasion and consented to the
continned occupancy of the land. Such is the rule of the
majority of the cases. (1'oolcer v. l~f?:ssouri P. &: L. Co., 336
Mo. 592 [80 S.W.2d 691, 101 A.L.R. 365] ; Thompson v.
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 191 Iowa 35 [179 N.W. 191]; Griffin
v. Jacksonville etc. Ry. Co., 33 Fla. 606 [15 So. 338]; 18
Am.Jur. p. 166; Hussey v. Bryant, 95 Me. 49 [49 A. 56];
Pinkham v. ChelrnsfMd, 109 Mass. 225; Hawver v. Omaha,
52 Neb. 734 [73 N.W. 217]; Oliver v. Monona County, 117
Iowa 43 [90 N.W. 510] ; Barnes v. Peck, 283 Mass. 618 [187
N.E. 176] ; and Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General,
124 U.S. 581 [8 S.Ct. 631, 31 L.Ed. 527].)" In Thompson
v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 191 Iowa 35 [179 N.W. 191], plaintiff recovered and collected a judgment for damages for the
market value of his land caused by defendant's construction
and maintenance of a railway embankment He sued again
for additional damages. It was held that he was bound by
his election because, in the first suit, he treated the invasion
as a permanent injury to his land, recovered damages based
upon a substantial reduction in the market value of his land,
and proceeded upon the theory that he shonld be treated as
having cheaper land because the permanent and wrongful
construction wonld injure his land at future times as it had in
the past. [2] In Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Cal.2d, 265, 267
et seq. [239 P.2d 625], which involved a nuisance, this court
said: "The remedy for a continuing nuisance was either a
suit for injunctive relief or successive actions for damages
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as new injuries ocenrred. Situations arose,
where
injunctive relief was not appropriate or where successive
actions were undesirable either to the plaintiff or the defendant or both. Accordingly, it was recognized that some
types of nuisances should be considered permanent, and in
such cases recovery of past and anticipated future damages
were allowed in one action. (Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol.
Elec. Ry. Co., 103 Cal. 614, 622 [37 P. 750, 42 Am.St.Rep.
149]; ~Williams v. Smdhern Pac. Co., 150 Cal. 624, 626-628
[89 P. 599]; Rankin v. DeBare, 205 Cal. 639, 641 [271 P.
1050]; see McCormick on Damages, § 127, pp. 504-505.)
"The clearest case of a permanent nuisance or trrspass is
the one where the offending structure or condition is maintained as a necessary part of the operations of a public utility.
Since such conditions are ordinarily of indefinite duration
and since the utility by making compensation is entitled
to continue them, it is appropriate that only one action should
be allowed to recover for all the damages inflicted. It would
be unfair to the utility to subject it to successive suits and
unfair to the injured party if he were not alkwed to recover
all of his probable damages at once. (See M.•.1Jormic.k, Damages for Anticipated Injnry to Land, 37 Harv.L.Rev. 574,
584-585.)
"A more difficult problem is presented, however, if the
defendant is not privileged to continue the nuisance or
trespass but its abatement is impractical or the plaintiff is
willing that it continue if he can secure full compensation
for both pa8': and anticipated future injuries. To attempt
categorically to classify such a nuisance as either permanent
or not may lead to serious injustice to one or the other of
the parties. Thus, if the plaintiff assumes it is not permanent and sues only for past damages, he may be met with
the plea of res judicata in a later action for additional injury
if the court then decides the nuisance was permanent in
character from its inception. (See Slater v. Shell Oil Co.,
58 Cal.App.2d 864, 870 [137 P.2d 713] .) Similarly, if the
initial injury is slight and plaintiff delays suit until he has
suffered substantial damage and the court then determines
that the nuisance was permanent, the defendant may be able
to raise the defense that the statute of limitations ran from
the time of the initial injury. (See Phillips v. City of Pasadena, 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108 [162 P.2d 6251.) On the other
hand, if the defendant is willing and able to abate the
nuisance, it is unfair to award damages on the theory that

OcL

Kor~NOPF

v.

KINGSBURG CoTTON

OrL

Co.

271

[45 C.2d 2G5; 238 P.2d 507]

it will continue. (See Meek v. De Latour, 2 Cal.App. 261,
265
P. 300j; cf., Collier v. Merced Irr. Dist., 213 Cal.
366 [2 P.2d 7DO] ; Colorado P. Co. v. Pacific G. & E. Co.,
218 Cal. 559, 567 [24 P.2d 495].)
"Because of these difficulties it has been recognized that
doubtful cases the plaintiff should have an election to
treat the nuisance as either permanent or not. (Kafka v.
191 CaL 746, 752 [218 P. 753, 29 A.L.R. 833] ; see
Hcstatement, Torts, § 930; McCormick on Damages, § 127,
p. 511 et seq.; 4 Sntherland on Damages [4th ed.], § 1046,
p.
If the dclenclant is not privileged to continue the
naisa11ce and is able to abate it, he cannot complain if the
plaintiff elects to bring succe~;sive actions as damages accrue
until abatement takes place. (Phillips v. City of Pasadena,
27 Cal.2c1 10,!, 107-108 [162 P.2d 625]; Strong v. Sullivan,
180 Cal. 331, 334-335 [181 P. 59, 4 A.L.R. 343].) On the
other hand, if it appears improbable as a practical matter
that the nuisance can or will be abated, the plaintiff should
not be left to the troublesome remedy of successive actions.
(See Restatement, Torts, § 930, comment c; McCormick, Darnages for Anticipated Injury to Land, 37 Harv.lJ.Rev. 574,
594-595.) ''
In the present case, defendant's ginning mill is lawfully
Ol)erated in a location properly zoned therefor and need not,
or may not (Code Civ. Proc., § 731a), be abated. If plaintiffs are not permitted to sur for all damages, past, present
and future, then they must bring suecessive actions each year
at the close of each ginning season with the ~ttendant risk
that the court may determine that the trespass occurring
the previous year was a permanent one for which plaintiffs
had been theretofore adequately compensated.
It appears that here plaintiffs elected to sue for all damages past, present and future and that sueh damages
are recoverable under the rule heretofore set forth (Spaulding
v. Camemn, supra, 38 Cal.2c1 265).
[3] Defendant argues that damages for discomfort and
annoyance are erroneously awarded in the absence of personal
injury. 'l'his argument centers around the heretofore quoted
instruction and upon the ground that plaintiffs did not allege
such discomfort awl annoyance. Plaintiffs' amended complaint shows that the ''comfort and enjoyment of the plaintiffs and their family of their said home have been diminished
to the extent that they have been unable to live normally
and peacefully and follow ordinary pursuits, that the use
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eurtailed due to the said dust
have been deprived
value of same." It was also alleged that they
had suffered severe nervous distress and mental anguish. The
pleading would seem to be sufficient to permit damages for discomfort and annoyance if such damages are otherwise proper.
[ 4] It appears to us that the discomfort and annoyance
suffered by plaintiffs is an injury directly and proximately
caused by defendant's invasion of their property and that
such damages would naturally result from such an invasion.
It also appears to us that discomfort and annoyance may be
suffered where there is no physical injury suffered. [5] In
Herzog v. Grosso, 41 Cal.2d 219, 225 [259 P.2d 429], the trial
court found that plaintiffs were caused to suffer "nervousness,
worry, and mental distress for the safety of themselves and
their daughter and others obliged to use said road on account
of the dangerous conditions under which said defendant,
Paul J. Grosso, forced them . . . to use said parcels . . . in
going to and from their said home.'' vV e said: ''Once a
cause of action for trespass or nuisance is established, an
occupant of lnnd may recover damages for annoyance and
discomfort that would naturally ensue therefrom. (Anderson
v. Souza, 38 Cal.2d 825. 83:3 [243 P.2d 497]; Judson v. Los
Angeles Suburban (]as Co., 157 Cal. 168, 172 [106 P. 581,
21 Ann.Cas. 1247, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 18:3] ; Thompson v. Simonds,
68 Cal.App.2d 151, 162 [155 P.2d 870]; Hest., Torts,§ 929(c),
com. g.) In Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal.App.2d 778 [214 P.2d
50], an action for damages resulting from blasting operations,
the court sustained an award for discomfort, fright, and
shock caused by a blast that occurred at a time when plaintiff
was not at home. The court stated: 'Plaintiff testified that
after the February :3 blast (in which a rock destroyed a bench
on the property Jwar >Yh ieh one of his daughters was standing) he could not rest or sleep beeause of fear for his own
security and that of his family. 'l'his is a form of discomfort
for which plaintiff under the circumstances of this case is
entitled to recover, as well as for other discomfort not challenged on appeal.' (95 Cal.App.2d at 788.) Similarly, in
the present case the suffering caused by fear for the safety
of the daughter and visitors was a natural consequence of
defendant's conduct and an invasion of a protectible interest
of an occupant of real property. The cases relied upon by
defendant did not involve an invasion of a protectible interest
in real property and are therefore not controlling here."
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Defendant here challenges the applicability of the above
quoted cases on the theory that the lack of sleep, fear, and
shock suffered by plaintiff there were injuries to the pl'rson
and that discomfort and annoyance were a part thereof. \V e
do not so construe II erzog v. Grosso. \Ve speeifically held
that annoyance and discomfort were natural consequences of
such "an invasion of a protectible interest in real property."
[6] While defendant's trespass here is not of the type to
cause fright or shock or even physical illness (as found by
the jury), it obviously is of the type to cause plaintiffs much
annoyancr and discomfort. Plaintiffs' property-lawns. flowers, shrubs, window screens, hedges and furniture are, during
the ginning season which lasts for approximately six months
of each year, covered with a thick coating of dust and lint
and ginning waste. This was specifically found to be a trespass and an injury to the real property. The annoyance
and discomfort suffered by plaintiffs as a result of the injury
to the real property is a natural consequence thereof.
[7] Section 929 of the R0statement of Torts sets forth the
rule as follows : '' \Vhere a person is entitled to a judgment for
harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction in value, the damages include
compensation for . . . (c) discomfort and annoyance, in
an action brought by the occupant." (Emphasis added.)
"Comment on Clause (c): g. Discomfort and other bodily
and mental harms. Discomfort and annoyance to an occupant of the land and to the members of his hous0hold are
distinct grounds of compensation for which in ordinary cases
the person in possession is allowed to recover in addition to
the harm to his proprietary interests. He is also allowed to
recover for his own serious sickness or oth0r substantial bodily
harm but is not allowed to recover for such serious harm to
other members of the household, except so far as he maintains
an action as a husband, parent or child, under the rules
stated in §§ 693 and 703, vol. III. The owner of land who
is not an occupant is not entitled to recover for such harms
except as they may have affected the rental value of his land."
This section was relied upon by the court in Alonso v. Hills,
95 Cal.App.2d 778 [214 P.2d 50], where blasting was involved.
The court there, speaking of the case of Cook v. Maier,
33 Cal.App.2d 581 [92 P.2d 434], said (p. 787): "That
case, which involves fright caused by one isolated negligent
collision in plaintiff's immediate proximity is not in point
here where the distress and fright were caused by repeated
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blastings which injured
real
and disturbed
its comfortable enjoyment both by their immediate impact
and
the reasonable fear of future danger. 'l'he recovery
snch 1:nvaswn of his
in the real
to which
the owner-occupant is entitled includes discomfort ancl annoyance
Torts, § 929 (c) ; Judson v. Los Angeles
Suburban Gas Co., 157 CaL 168, 172
P. 581, 21 Ann.Cas.
1247, 26 L.R.A.?\.S. 183]; Dauberman v.
198 Cal. 586,
590 [246 P. 319. 48 A.L.R. 12<!4]; Green v. Geneml Pcirolcmn
205 Cal ::128. 337 [270 P. 952, 60 A.L.R.
. ) " In
Green v. Gnural Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal.
386, 337
[270 P. 9:52, 60 A.hR. 475], an action for damages for trespass because of oil drilling operations was involved. 'l'he
trial court specifically found that defendants had not been
negligPnt. Plaintiffs were forced to leave their home, and
this court said: "No special damag·es, such as cost of removal
from the premises, loss of r(,ntals of the premises, or cost
of renting another home, were alleged or proved. \Ve are
not, however, left to speculation as to the basis on which
the trial court fixed the amount of the damages allowed for
eviction. The law afl'ords redress by givi11g damages against
a wrongdoer for the annoyance and discomforts sufFered in
such cases as thi~." Apparently no personal injuries w·ere
suffered in the Green case. In Dauberrnan v. Grant, 198 Cal.
586, 590 [246 P. 319, 48 A.L.R. 1244], an action for damages
for nuisance was involved. Defendant there maintained a
smokestack on premises adjoining those of the plaintiff; smoke
therefrom was emitted to plainiiff's dwelling house. 'l'his
court said: ''It was not nrr'• ssary to the recovery of damages
caused by the nnisance of ·mwke and soot to prove actual
damage to plaintiff's property. She was entitled to recover
for the personal discomfort and annoyance to which she had
been subjected and it was a question for the trial court to
determine the amount of the compensation which she should
receive. (.htdson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., .mpra.)"
Apparently physical injury was not involved in the Dauberman case. In Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157
Cal. 168, 172 [106 P. 581, 21 Ann.Cas. 1247, 26 hR.A.N.S.
183 J, an action for damages for opETating a nuisance in the
form of a gasworks was involved. The court there said
(p. 170): "There is no proof that plaintiff's land has depreciated; that its rental value has been impaired; nor that the
health of Mr. Judson or that of any member of his family has
been injuriously affected by the operation of defendants·
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He did assert, however, that the
the manufactnre of gas at de:i'endants'
works interfered with his comfortable enjoyment of his
property . . . .
''In order that a judgment of this character may be upheld,
it is not nec<'ssary that the health of piaintiff or of members
of his household should have been impaired. It is sufficient
and smoke were offensive to the senses.
23 N.J.Eq. 201: Coker v. Birge, 9 Ga. t!28
[54 Am.Dec. :347]; Cleveland v. C1:tizens Gas Light Co., 20
N ..J .Eq. 206: Bohan v. Port J erv1s Gas Light Co., 122 N.Y.
23 [25 N.E.
; Hayden v. Tuckc1·, 37 l\Io. 221.)" In
Anderson v.
38 Cal.2d 825 [243 P.2cl 497], an action
was brought seeking damages for the maintenance of a nuisance through the operation of an airport. In that case this
conrt affirmed an award of damages to certain of the plaintiffs
for the annoyance and discomfort caused by defendants'
operation of the airport. Defendants contend that the Anderson case is disting-uishable on the ground that there plaintiffs
testified that they had become hysterical, vomited and suffered
impaired health. 'I'he court, in affirming the award of damages for discomfort and annoyauce, relied upon Judson v.
Los Angeles S1tbnrban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 172 [106 P.
581. 21 Ann.Cas. 1247, 2ti L.R.A.N.S. 183], and Alonso v.
Hills, 9i:i Cal.A.pp.2d 778, 787-788 1214 P.2d 50]. In the
Judson case no impairment of plaintiff's health was involved;
in the Alonso case, the court uoted that $1,000 in damages
was awarded for "plaintiff's distress in body and mind, discomfort and annoyance, fright and shock; . . . ''
[8] The California cases appear to draw no distinction
between eases involving nuisance and those involving trespass
in permitting an award of damages for discomfort and annoyance directly resultiug from an injury to real property. There
seems to be no sound reason to refuse to award damages for
diseomfort and annoyance where the only injury is to the
I'''al property since it is obvious that such an ll1JUry may
c-ause discomfort and annoyance without also causing an
adual physical injnry to the person.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and
Spence, J., concurred. Schauer, J., concurred in the judgment.

